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INTRODUCTION
Bruce Harper was hired by Drive Line, LLC (Drive Line), on June 18, 2014,
to drive trucks to deliver cargo on Drive Line's behalf. (See Finding of Fact,
Gii

Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings & Order) (May 18, 2017), R. at 364, ,r,r
1, 5. A copy of the Findings & Order is appended hereto at Exhibit A.) Energy
Enterprises, Inc., (Energy Enterprises) is an entity that is affiliated with but
separate from Drive Line. (R. at 594-95, 633-34. Unless circumstances dictate
otherwise, Drive Line and Energy Enterprises shall collectively be referred to
hereinafter as "Drive Line.")

Mr. Harper voluntarily terminated his

employment with Drive Line on September 9, 2018, when he refused to take a
load for which he was scheduled to deliver. (See R. at 369, ,r,r 15.g, 15.h, 15.i,
15.j, 16.)
Mr. Harper filed a wage claim on November 6, 2014, with the Wage Claim
Unit of the Utah Labor Commission's Antidiscrimination and Labor Division
(UALD), claiming only that he was owed $796.25 for "unpaid wages," and falsely
claiming that (a) he was employed by Energy Enterprises, (b) that he started
employment on April 15, 2014, (c) that he did not quit, (d) that he was paid
$22.75 per hour, and (e) that he has not been paid for 35 hours of work (See R.
at 370, ,r,r 19, 20.) After losing the informal adjudicative hearing, Mr. Harper
filed a petition for review with the Third Judicial District Court. After a trial de
1
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novo, the trial court entered final judgment against Mr. Harper in all respects.
(See R. at 722-26. A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) After

Mr. Harper filed post-judgment motions, the trial court entered an Order
denying Mr. Harper's motions and granting Drive Line's motion for a vexatious
litigant order finding "by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harper is a
vexatious litigant" and ordered that "before filing any additional motions, or
requesting from this Court any relief related to his initial claim or the
supplemental proceedings, Mr. Harper must obtain legal counsel." (See R. at
932-35 (Vexatious Litigant Order). A copy of the Vexatious Litigant Order is
appended hereto as Exhibit C.)
Drive Line should prevail in this appeal because this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and, even if it did, Mr. Harper did not show that
the findings of fact entered by the trial court were clearly erroneous and did not
show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Harper's discovery
motions and motion for new trial. Moreover, Drive Line should be awarded its
fees and costs on appeal because it was awarded the fees below and because of
Mr. Harper's additional vexatious litigation practices.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a trial court's

review of an informal adjudication of the Wage Claim Division of the UALD?

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

a.

Standard of Review. '''Whether appellate jurisdiction exists

0j

is a question of law which [the courts] review for correctness .... "' Gailey
v. State, 2016 UT 35,

,r 8, 379 P.3d 1278 (quoting Migliore v. Livingston

Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, ,r 15, 347 P.3d 394).

b.

Preservation. The question of appellate review was not

raised below because the issue of appellate review did not arise until Mr.
Harper appealed the case to this court.
II.

Did the trial court clearly err when it found that Mr. Harper agreed

to be paid based upon a fixed amount of mileage rather than actual distance on
deliveries he made on a contract Drive Line had with Estes?
a.

Standard of Review. The courts "review findings of fact for

clear error, 'reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if [they] otherwise reach a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made."' Grimm v. DxNA LLC, 2018 UT App 115,

,r 12

(quoting LD Ill, LLCv. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 301, ,r 13,221 P.3d 867).
III.

Did the trial court clearly err when it found that Mr. Harper acted

in bad faith during the course of the litigation?
a.

Standard of Review. The courts "review findings of fact for

clear error, 'reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if [they] otherwise reach a firm conviction that a
3
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mistake has been made."' Grimm v. DxNA LLC, 2018 UT App 115,

,r 12

(quoting LD Ill, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 301, ,r 13,221 P.3d 867).
IV.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Harper's

discovery requests and sanctioning Mr. Harper under Rule 37(a)(8) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure?
a.

Standard of Review. "As a general rule, [appellate courts] grant

district courts a great deal of deference in matters of discovery and review
discovery orders for abuse of discretion." Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r 63, 345
P.3d 566.
V.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Harper's

motion for new trial?
a.

Standard of Review. '"[A] large measure of discretion is vested in

the trial court in refusing or granting a motion for new trial on the ground that
there is an insufficiency of evidence to support ... the judgment," when the trial
court judge who heard the motion is the judge who presided over the case.
Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App 475, ,r,r 5-6, 153 P.3d 768 (quoting Pollesche
v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972)).

Moreover, '"The trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed
only if the evidence to support the [decision] was completely lacking or was so

4
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6iJ

slight and unconvincing as to make the [decision] plainly unreasonable and
unjust." Id. ,r 8.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
~

I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Bruce Harper was hired by Drive Line on June 18, 2014. (R. at 364, ,r 1.)
Kim Martino is an owner and officer of Drive Line. (Id.

,r 2.)

the Fleet Manager for Drive Line at all relevant times. (Id.

Greg Ostler was

,r 3.)

Prior to being hired, Mr. Harper interviewed with Greg Ostler who
explained Drive Line's compensation scheme. He explained that Drive Line
agreed to pay Mr. Harper $.36 per mile drive, which consisted of a base rate of
$.27 per mile, plus a $.09 per mile per-diem rate. This compensation was split
in half when working with a team driver. Drivers could also earn an additional
$.02 per mile incentive for meeting certain goals on an individual basis, the
safety bonus, and an additional $.02 per mile bonus for meeting certain goals
on a team basis, the production bonus. (Id.

,r S(a).)

Mr. Ostler also explained to Mr. Harper that certain routes were
compensated for at a fixed amount of mileage no matter the distance actually
driven. This fixed compensation was paid on all deliveries made by Drive Line

5
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for one of its customers named Estes. The fixed mileage for the route from Salt
Lake City, Utah to Toledo, Ohio was 1,626 round trip miles. 1 (/d.,r S(b).)
Every pay period Drive Line mailed Mr. Harper (a) a pay statement, (b) a
document entitled "Employee Pay Sheet," and, if applicable (c) a hand-written
time card. Mr. Harper received all of these documents after they were mailed.
The pay statements included the number of miles driven and/ or hours worked
for non-long haul driving and the regular and per diem rates paid based on
those miles and/ or hours. Every Employee Pay-Sheet included the name of
Drive Line LLC at the top. The Employee Pay Sheet identified every trip by trip
number and for every long haul trip, it included the amount of mileage credited
to the driver, the amount paid at the regular mileage rate and the amount paid
at the per diem mileage rate. It also identified the number of hours driven on
non-long haul matters, the rate of pay, and the total amount paid. Finally, if an
employee had earned any incentives for past trips, the Employee Pay Sheet
identified the trip and mileage qualifying for the incentive. (R. at 365, ,r,r 7(a)(b).)

On days when a driver was driving locally (rather than on a long-haul) or
attending training, Drive Line compensated drivers on an hourly rate between
$10 and $18 per hour depending on the type of work being performed. (R. at
365, ,r S(c).)
1

6
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Sometime after Mr. Harper began working for Drive Line, Drive Line
~

began offering a longevity bonus. The longevity bonus was not offered to Mr.
Harper at the time of his employment. The longevity bonus provided that a
driver who worked a requisite number of months with Drive Line as a full-time
driver was entitled to a bonus. Drive Line never offered a sign-on bonus to any
employee at any time. (R. at 365-66, ,r 8.)
On September 3, 2014, Mr. Harper texted Mr. Ostler to inquire about
when his "probation time [was] compleat2 as far as becoming an owner." (R. at
367, ,r 15(a).) On September 5, Mr. Harper followed up on his earlier text
message: "Was u able to figure my probation time to become an owner op.?"
Mr. Ostler responded, explaining that Mr. Harper was eligible at three or six
months depending on "how much you want to put down on the truck." (Id. at
367-68, ,r lS(b).) Mr. Harper responded with "O. Ok So lets negoicate .. Thats
if the co. Still Wants me? Lol". (Id. at 368, ,r1S(c).
The following day, September 6, 2014, Mr. Harper followed up again:
"What information did kim give u?" (R. at 368, ,r 15(c).) On September 7, before

~

Because text messages are often written in haste without conforming to
grammatical or spelling conventions, all text messages will be quoted as typed
without interlineation of sic to identify any spelling or grammatical errors.
2

7
CJj
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Mr. Ostler had responded to the inquiry sent the day before, Mr. Harper sent
another text message to Mr. Ostler in which he stated:
Before i go back out on wednesday ineed to resolve and renegociate
terms. U stated my income would be.40 a mile.. It is currently .38
a mile.. I want .45 a mile. I need to b paid on actual traveled miles.
1716 a trip .. I want to be assigned truck 33 .. Ifi am with a co. Driver
who is unable to do thier half of miles i will recieve the difference
of 90 miles (1716 to 1626) to my check.
(Id.

,r 15(e).)
On September 8, 2014, Mr. Ostler responded to Mr. Ostler's multiple

demands and questions. In response to Mr. Harper's demand for different
payment terms for his trips, Mr. Ostler stated:
The only drivers with a .40 base have been with us over a year-all
drivers start at .36 with incentives available via safety, operation
and very soon fuel bonus' -u are about due for your revue when if
you are meeting satandards could see raise to .37 plus incentives.
(R. at 368, ,r 1S(f).) In response to this text message, Mr. Harper stated, "U have

~

my terms. It is obvious that to u i am not worth those terms i will seek new
employment or talk with kim about the truck purchase. I have the down
payment avilabl." (Id. at 369, ,r 1S(g).)
After Mr. Ostler refused to negotiate Mr. Harper's demands for different
mileage payment terms, Mr. Harper stated, "Ok. Will u inform steve for me[?]"
(R. at 369, ,r 15(h).) Mr. Ostler wrote another text message in response at 8:22

a.m on September 9th:
8
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~

Please let Steve know ASAP if you are taking load with Mike
Chadwick tonight at 2 am-he needs to give as much notice as
possible for Estes if you aren't going to stay with us-we also need
fuel card for 32, we had to rob another truck and change it's# this
morning-thanks Bruce. . . . You can drop by office or if you are
going out tonight just drop in mailbox at yard-thanks again.
(Id.

,r 15(i).)

Three and half hours later, Mr. Harper texted Mr. Ostler telling

him, "I put the fuel card in shed." (Id.

,r 15(j).)

Mr. Harper never returned to Drive Line and never delivered another
load for Drive Line. (See Rat 571, 609-10.) During the entire time Mr. Harper
was employed by Drive Line he never claimed that he was owed more money
for any work that he had done nor did he complain about not getting paid any
bonus he was promised. (Id. at 572-73, 610.)
Nevertheless, on November 6, 2014, Mr. Harper filed a wage claim with
the Wage Claim Division of the UALD in which he specifically demand payment
of $796.25 for "unpaid wages."

(Id. at 546, 553-54, 572; id. at 1051,

Respondent's Exhibit (Resp. Ex.) 1 at ENERGY000002.) His claim stated that he
was seeking $0 for "Unpaid Bonus," $0 for "Unauthorized Deductions," and $0
for "Other Unpaid Wages." Bruce Harper affixed his electronic signature to this
document in which he stated, "I . . . swear that the information contained in this
form is true to the best of my knowledge." (Id. at 552-54; id. at 1051, Resp. Ex.
~

1 at ENERGY000002-4.)
9
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The wage claim included the following false statements:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mr. Harper's employer was Energy Enterprises.
Mr. Harper started employment on April 5, 2014.
The "First Date of Owed Wages" was May 14, 2014.
Mr. Harper did not quit.
Mr. Harper was paid $22.75 per hour.
Mr. Harper had not been paid for 35 hours of work.

(R. at 370-71, ,r,r 20-23.)

On the same date Mr. Harper filed the wage claim, he sent a text to Mr.
Ostler in which he stated: "Are you or energy going to pay me for my miles
driven through Michigan." (R. at 371, ,r 24.) He also called Kim Martino and
told her that "he had not been paid for the 'extra miles' for the Toledo ... loads."
(Id.

,r 25.)
Drive Line filed its response to the Wage Claim on December 11, 2014.

(R. at 1051, Petitioner's Exhibit (Pet. Ex.) 3.) Sometime after that time, Mr.

Harper had another telephone conversation with Ms. Martino.

In that

telephone conversation, Mr. Harper asked Ms. Martino how much she was
willing to pay to make the wage claim go away. (See Rat 3 71-72, ,r 2 7.)
On February 5, 2015, in response to Drive Line's answer to Mr. Harper's
wage claim, Mr. Harper, for the first time, claimed he should have been paid
$.46 per mile, a $5,000 sign-on bonus, and a flat-fee and a percentage of the
Estes contract. (R. at 372, ,r 28, R. at 1051, Pet. Ex. 3.) During the Wage Claim
10
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Hearing held on Mr. Harper's wage claim, Mr. Harper sought reimbursement
for unpaid mileage on the Toledo route, $.46 per mile for the mileage driven on
the Toledo route, and a $5,000 sign on bonus. (See R. at 8, 722 at ,r 29.) Further,
Mr. Harper argued that "Drive Line never actually terminated his employment
and for all he knew they still employed him. Ergo Mr. Harper reasoned that as
he ostensibly remained employed by Drive Line, he should be paid the
appropriate installments of the 'Longevity Bonus."' (See id. at 11, 722 at ,r 30.)
On April 22, 2015, the Wage Claim Unit dismissed Mr. Harper's claims
with prejudice. (See R. at 8-12, 372, ,r 31.) In Mr. Harper's Petition for Judicial
Review of Final Agency Action filed on February 19, 2016, Mr. Harper asserted
claims for $5,846.00 in claims for "dispute over unpaid wages & [inappropriate]
deductions on the petitioner['s] checks." (R at 2, ,r 4.)
~

During the trial court proceeding held pursuant to the petition for judicial
review, the trial court found that Mr. Harper had engaged in a series of frivolous
filings. Specifically,

•

On March 14, 2016, he filed a Motion to Disqualify Defendant's
Council (sic) (UALD) and Petitioner's Request for Utah States
Council (sic) and Representation (R. at47-50), which the trial court
denied ruling that "Petitioner has failed to provide a sufficient legal
or factual basis to disqualify the Attorney General's Office." (R. at
63-65.)

•

On August 2, 2016, he served Interrogatories and Requests for
Production demanding that the Respondents answer and respond
11
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"within three weeks" and then filed a motion to compel on August
26, 2016 (R. at 75), which the trial court denied (i) ruling that (a)
"Petitioner's Motion is procedurally improper because it fails to
comply with the basic requirements of Rule 37 of the [URCP]," and
(b) "Petitioner's First Set of Discovery is untimely," and (ii)
cautioning Mr. Harper "that frivolous filings or pleadings could
subject Petitioner to sanctions under the [URCP] or an award of
attorneys' fees. (R. at 113-116.)

•

•

On September 8, 2016, he served a Motion to Extend Time for
Petitioner to Complete Disscovery (sic) (R. at 117), which the trial
court denied ruling that Mr. Harper "fail[ ed] to comply with the
certification requirements in Rule 3 7" and that the motion was
"untimely," and awarding Drive Line attorney fees because the
motion "lacked a reasonable legal or factual basis" and was,
therefore, frivolous. (See R. at 184-87, 240-44.)
On September 16, 2016, he served a Motion to Amend Petition (R.
at 121-123), which the trial court denied ruling that the motion was
untimely, and that "the proposed amendments ... fail[ ed] to set
forth legally cognizable claims and [sought] relief that is not
available, and awarding Drive Line attorney fees because the
motion lacked a reasonable legal or factual basis and was,
therefore, frivolous. (See R. at 184-87, 240-44.)

(i:;

~

~

~
.

~

~

•

•

On October 25, 2016, he served yet another Motion to Compel
Disclosure (R. at 188), which the trial court denied, holding that
"[t]he motion fail[ed] to comply with the [URCPr and "appear[ed]
to seek the same relief that Petitioner sought in his previous"
motions and again cautioning the Petitioner "that additional
frivolous filing may result in sanctions." (R. at 225-27 .)
On March 14, 2017, one week before trial, Mr. Harper submitted a
trial brief, in which, for the first time, he claimed, (a) he was owed
$300 for allegedly not being reimbursed for a fuel payment and (b)
he was owed an additional $300 for his wages. Just one day before
the trial, Mr. Harper informed counsel he was withdrawing those
claims. (R. at 327-29.)
12
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4tw

~

~

(R. at 373-74, ,r,r 37(a)-(e).)
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2014, Mr. Harper filed a wage claim with the Wage Claim
Division of the UALD.

(R at 546, 553-54, 572; id. at 1051, Resp. Ex. 1 at

ENERGY000002.) On April 22, 2015, the Wage and Hour Division dismissed
Mr. Harper's claims with prejudice. (R. at 8-12.)
On June 15, 2015, Mr. Harper filed a Petition for Review with this court
(Harper v. Utah Labor Commission Antidiscrimination and Labor Division Wage
Claim Unit, Appeal No 20150474), which was transferred to the Third District

Court pursuant to an order dated June, 26, 2015. (See Order, Appellate Case No
20150474-CA (June 26, 2015). A copy is appended as Exhibit D.) The petition
for review was dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve the parties. (See
~

R. at 13-15.)

Mr. Harper then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of Final Agency Action
on February 19, 2016. (R. at 1-14.) During the course of the proceeding, Mr.
Harper filed a number of pleadings that are relevant to this proceeding that
have been discussed in the Statement of the Case section above. After a bench
trial was held on March 22, 2017, the trial court entered the Findings and Order
on May 17, 2017. (R. at 363-79.) The trial court then entered its Findings of
Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Attorneys' Fees and Costs on August 3,
13
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2017, (R. at 465-73, a copy is appended as Exhibit E), and its Judgment on
September 6, 2017, (R. at 722-26). After Mr. Harper filed a motion for new trial
(see R. at 705-716), Drive Line filed a motion for the trial court to enter a
vexatious litigant order against Mr. Harper. (Id. at 739-54.) On October 18,
2017, the trial court denied Mr. Harper's motion for a new trial and granted
Drive Line's motion for entry of a vexatious litigant order. (R. at 932-35.)
Mr. Harper appealed the trial court's judgment by Notice of Appeal dated
November 17, 2017. (R. at 994-96.)
III.

DISPOSITION BELOW

On November 13, 2017, the trial court entered judgment against Mr.
Harper and in favor of Drive Line, awarding $16,285.00 in attorney fees and
costs, plus statutory post-judgment interest. R. at 722-26.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Drive Line should prevail because this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. Although the Utah Court of Appeals generally has jurisdiction over
appeals from a district court review of informal administrative adjudications,
see Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii), the general jurisdictional grant does not

provide the subject-matter jurisdiction for this appeal. The Court of Appeals
jurisdiction is limited in wage claim disputes by a further provision that
requires it to comply with the requirements of the Utah Administrative
14
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Procedures Act (UAPA). Id. § 78A-4-103(4). Because the UAPA, specifically
limits appellate jurisdiction of informal adjudications to the district court and
only allows further review "by a higher court" in situations specifically
"authorized by statute," see id.§§ 63G-4-402(a), and the Payment of Wages Act
does not authorize appellate review above the district court level, the UAPA
requires that appellate review of informal wage claim adjudicative hearings be
limited to the district court trial de novo.
Even if this court did have jurisdiction, Mr. Harper cannot prevail on any
of the issues raised in his appeal. First, Mr. Harper fails to meet his burden to
show that the trial court clearly erred with regard to his first two issues for
appeal. Mr. Harper arguments are nothing more than complaints that the trial
court should have believed his testimony or should have interpreted the
testimony and evidence the way that he wanted-he never attempts to meet
his burden to show that the trial court's findings were against the clear weight
of the evidence. Moreover, Mr. Harper fails to acknowledge with respect to his
second issue on appeal that, even if he were to somehow meet his burden to
show clear error with respect the single bad-faith factor finding that he
challenges, Drive Line was only required to establish one of three bad-faith
factors to prevail, and the trial court found that Drive Line proved all three.
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Moreover, Mr. Harper failed to meet his burden to show that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Mr. Harper to conduct discovery
in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court's explicit
scheduling orders or in refusing to grant Mr. Harper's motion for new trial.
Again, Mr. Harper's arguments are simply complaints that the trial court did not
agree with him and grant the relief he requested.
Finally, because the trial court awarded attorney fees to Drive Line, this
court's long-standing precedent requires it to award attorney fees on appeal.
Even if the precedent did not demand an award of fees, Mr. Harper's continuing
vexatious litigations practices warrant the imposition of fees.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL

"'Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which [the
courts] review for correctness ...."' Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35, ,r 8, 379 P.3d
1278 (quoting Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, ,r 15,347 P.3d 394).
As the appellate courts of this state have frequently discussed, the Utah
Court of Appeals is a court of statutory creation. See Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Leahy, 848 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The Legislature created the

court of appeals under Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-1 (1992).") "[B]ecause the court
of appeals is a statutory court, the Legislature has the power to define [the
16
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court's] jurisdiction." Id. When "the Legislature has expressly limited [the
court's] jurisdiction," the Court of Appeals cannot exceed that jurisdiction. Id.;
accord Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, ,r 35, 70 P.3d 47.

In this case, the Utah legislature has expressly provided that this court
does not have jurisdiction in this case. As described above, the underlying claim
in this case originated as a wage claim brought before the UALD's Wage Claim
Unit. The Payment of Wages Act (the Act), Utah Code§§ 34-28-1 to -19 (2017), 3
charges the Wage Claim Unit with "ensur[ing] compliance" with the Act and
"determin[ing] the validity of a claim for any violation of [the Act] that is filed
with the division by an employee." Id. § 34-28-9(1)(a). The Act further
authorizes the Wage Claim Unit to "make rules consistent with [the Act]
governing wage claims and payment of wages." Id.§ 34-28-9(1)(b). The Act,
however, provides no further direction regarding the appellate rights of a
person bringing a wage claim under the Act. In such circumstances the UAPA
~

governs all questions of jurisdiction. See id.§§ 63G-4-101(1); 63G-4-105.
In this case, pursuant to its authority to do so under UAPA, id.§ 63G-3201(2)(d), and pursuant to the direction of the Payment of Wages Act, id.§ 34-

3

The Payment of Wages Act was substantively amended in 2018. Because all
of the court's relevant orders and judgment were entered prior to the revision,
this brief refers to the Payment of Wages Act as it existed at the time of the entry
of the judgment, November 13, 2017.
17
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28-9(1)(a), the UALD enacted rules governing wage claims. See Utah Admin.
Gt.;

Code R610-3-1 to -22.

In enacting the administrative rules to govern wage

claims, the UALD, pursuant to its right to do so under Utah Code § 63G-4202 (1), designated wage claim hearings as presumptively informal, subject to
being declared formal by the presiding officer. Utah Admin. Code R610-3-9(A).
In this case, the Wage Claim Unit administrative law judge never converted Mr.
Harper's claim to a formal adjudication. (See generally R. at 8-12.)
Only "[t] he district courts have jurisdiction to review trial de novo ... final
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code §
63G-4-402(a). The UAPA provides further that "[d]ecisions on petitions for
judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court if
authorized by statute." Id. § 63G-4-404(2). Thus, a district court's decision
regarding a wage claim is only reviewable by this court if some statute
authorizes further appellate review. In this case, the Payment of Wages Act
does not authorize further appellate review of a district court's de novo
appellate determinate regarding a wage claim. See generally Utah Code §§ 3428-1 to -19.
Moreover, the general jurisdictional grant to the Utah Court of Appeal
found in Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) does not provide the subject-matter
jurisdiction for such an appeal. Although the statute does provide generally for
18
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"appellate jurisdiction" over "an appeal from the district court review of an
informal adjudicative proceeding of an agency," it limits the jurisdiction by
providing that "[t]he Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings." Id.§ 78A-4-103(4). Because the UAPA specifically
limits appellate jurisdiction to the district court and only allows further review
"by a higher court" in situations specifically "authorized by statute," see id. §§
63G-4-402(a), the UAPA requires that appellate review of informal Wage Claim
adjudicative hearings be limited to the district court's trial de novo review.
Accordingly, because this court does not have appellate jurisdiction, it
must dismiss Mr. Harper's appeal. Leahy, 848 P.2d at 181. Moreover, as
discussed below, even if this court did have jurisdiction, Mr. Harper is not
entitled to any relief for the issues that he raises in his appeal.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT MR. HARPER AGREED
TO BE PAID BASED UPON A FIXED AMOUNT OF MILEAGE RATHER THAN ACTUAL
DISTANCE ON DELIVERIES HE MADE ON AN ESTES CONTRACT.

The first issue Mr. Harper raises in his briefing is a challenge to an
amalgamation of factual findings, all of which relate to Mr. Harper's agreed
upon rate of pay. (See Brief of Appellant at 5-6 (Appellant's Brief).) As will be
discussed below, Mr. Harper cannot meet his heavy burden to show that the
trial court erred when it made the factual findings.
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When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence [to
support a factual finding], [the courts] will not set aside a trial
court's factual findings 'unless clearly erroneous,' giving 'due
regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."'
Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ,r 3, 406 P.3d 258. "A party challenging

~

the sufficiency of the evidence 'will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of
persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal' the evidence in support of the
challenged finding." Id. (quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42, 326 P.3d
645). When a party brings an appeal to "a superior court to review the decision

(tJ

of a lower court, Utah appellate rules require the appellant to address reasons
why the district court's dismissal of his petition should be overturned." Allen v.
Friel, 2008 UT 56,

,r

14, 194 P.3d 903. This means that a party, when

challenging factual findings must do more than "reargue [his or] her position"
from the lower tribunal. Welte v. DWS, 2011 UT App 46,

,r 4, 249

P.3d 568.

When courts "review findings of fact for clear error, [they] 'revers[e] only
where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [they]
otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' Grimm v.
DxNA LLC, 2018 UT App 115, ,r 12 (quoting LD III, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App

301, ,r 13, 221 P.3d 867).
In Mr. Harper's argument he does not contend that the trial court clearly
erred by showing that the findings to which he objects are against the clear
20
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weight of evidence, but instead argues variously the trial testified differently
from the trial court's finding and did not "[give] ... the proper weight of the
evidence" Harper submitted. (See Appellant's Brief at 20, 35-36.)
Mr. Harper repeatedly cites selectively from the trial transcript and
essentially complains that the trial court should have believed his testimony or
should have interpreted the testimony and evidence the way that Mr. Ha~per
argued it should have been interpreted. Of course, as discussed above, the
relevant question that this court has to answer is not whether the appealing
party's testimony could support the appealing party's position, but whether the
trial court's finding is against the "clear weight of the evidence."
The specific findings that Mr. Harper is challenging were not entered
against the clear weight of the evidence.
A.

Finding 1f S[a) Was Not Entered Against the Clear Weight of
Evidence.

In his statement of issues Mr. Harper complains that the first sentence of
Finding ,r S(a) was clearly erroneous. However, Mr. Harper spends no time in
his brief explaining his opposition to the finding. Accordingly, this court should
not consider this argument. In re Estate of Paul, 2007 UT App 389, ,r 17, 174
P.3d 642 (holding that a court may take appropriate measure to sanction a
party for his failure to properly argue his brief, including disregarding an issue
21
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not properly briefed).

Even if the court were to consider Mr. Harper's

arguments regarding Fining ,r S(a), the finding was not against the clear weight
of the evidence.
The exact language of Finding ,r S(a) is:
Drive Line and Mr. Harper agreed that Mr. Harper would be paid
$.36 per mile (which consisted of a base rate of $.27 per mile, plus
$.09 per mile per diem). This compensation was split in half when
working with a team driver. Drivers could also earn an additional
$.02 per mile incentive for meeting certain goals on an individual
basis, and an additional $.02 per mile bonus for meeting certain
goals on a team basis.
Aside from the testimony of Mr. Ostler4 and the Payroll Records (R. at

1051, Resp. Ex. 5), Mr. Harper's own text messages demonstrated that he knew
he was being paid $.36 per mile as a base and was never told he would receive

$.42 to $.44 per mile. (See R. at 1051, Resp. Ex. 4.) In his text messages, he
claims to being told he would receive $.40 per mile, which he would have
received if he had qualified for both bonuses ($.36 + $.02 (individual bonus)
+$.02 (team bonus)). Furthermore, Mr. Harper's original wage claim and his
text message immediately following the filing of the wage claim asserted only
that he had not been paid the full mileage on the Toledo runs-he never claimed
he had been underpaid for all of his mileage.

4

These contemporaneous

See R. at 596,601,608,617.
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communications imply that Mr. Harper never believed that he should have been
paid more per mile than he was paid. Accordingly, there was significant
evidence supporting Findings

,r S(a), and, therefore, Mr. Harper has failed to

meet his burden to demonstrate that there was "insufficient evidence to
support" it.
B.

Finding 1[1[ S(b), 6, 35, and 38(a) Were Not Entered Against the Great
Weight of the Evidence.

Next, Mr. Harper argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found
that Mr. Harper had agreed to be to be paid at a flat rate based on fixed mileage
(rather than actual mileage) on trips to Toledo, Ohio when delivering products
for a Drive Line customer named Estes. Specifically, he contends that the trial
court should not have entered Findings ,r,r S(b), 6, 35, and 38(a) because, Mr.
Harper claims, the testimony at trial established (i) that he did not agree to the
fixed mileage, (ii) that because the trial court would not allow him to inquire
about the profitability of the Estes contracts with Drive Line, he was somehow
disadvantaged, and (iii) that somehow this payment arrangement on the fixed
mileage was illegal. Each of these arguments is simply wrong.
Not only is there sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings,
but the evidence is overwhelming-all evidence Mr. Harper failed to cite to this
court. First, aside from the mountain of evidence supporting the route mileage
23
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disclosure,5 Mr. Harper admitted during the trial that he clearly knew at the
time he was hired that he would be compensated only route miles on the route
from Salt Lake City to Toledo.
Q.
. . . . You knew, at the time that you were hired, that you
would be paid on route mileage to Toledo. That's what they told
you, right?
A.
Correct.
Q.
And they told you those miles were 1,626 to Toledo, right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
. ... They never told you ["]we're going to pay you for your
actual miles ... traveled on those routes,["] right?
A.
No, they never stated that I was going to be doing 100 extra
miles.
Q.
. ... What I asked you is, you knew you were going to be paid
on a fixed route, correct?
A.
Correct.

(R. at 56 7-70.) In fact, as discussed supra footnote 5, every single person who

testified at the trial testified that the Toledo route was compensated at a fixed
amount. Additionally, all but Mr. Jenkins-who was never asked-testified that
the total fixed mileage to be compensated for the Toledo run was 1,626 miles. 6

~

See R. at 495-96 (Brian Jenkins); id. at 601-603, 621-22, 626-27, 632 (Greg
Ostler); id. at 640, 650-Sl(Kim Martino).
6 While Mr. Ostler initially testified that the amount to be paid was a different
number because his "memory's not that good," when his memory was refreshed
by an exhibit, he corrected his testimony to the correct number. (R. at 602,
632.)
24
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Second, Mr. Harper claims that there was no evidence that there was a
contract with Estes. (Appellant's Brief at 30.) While Ms. Martino did testify
that Drive Line "did not have a contract," she later explained what she meant"We were on an at-will dispatch. We could take the loads or another carrier
could take the load. It was entirely up to us. We did not have a contract." (R. at
648.) She further stated that she instructed Mr. Ostler to tell all new employees
the flat fee mileage rate for the Toledo trips because "[t]hat's how we were
paid." (Id. at 650-51.) Accordingly, Mr. Martino clearly testified that Drive Line
had an agreement with Estes to haul loads for Estes to Toledo at a fixed mileage
rate-she only clarified that Drive Line was not obligated to take any loads by
contract. Thus, evidence supports the finding in every respect.
Additionally, whether Drive Line made a profit on the Estes loads or how
Estes compensated Drive Line is entirely irrelevant to whether Mr. Harper was
not paid his wages pursuant to his employment agreement with Drive Line.
Obviously, if Drive Line lost money on an Estes run, the loss would have no
bearing on whether it was required to pay Mr. Harper the amount it had
contracted to pay him for taking the run-even if Drive Line lost money on the
Estes contract, it would be required to pay Mr. Harper the amount it had
contracted with him to pay.

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Finally, Mr. Harper argues that the findings must be incorrect otherwise
employers could get away with forcing employees to work hours in a day
without compensation. (Appellant's Brief at 35-36.) This was a new theory that
Mr. Harper never raised until he filed his motion to amend findings and for a
new trial on insufficiency of evidence. (R. at 1-14, 327-29, 668-69, 709.)
Raising such issues after trial, of course, is prohibited. See Fontenot v. Mesa

Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a "motion to
amend should [not] be employed ... to advance new theories"). Even if it were
not a new theory improperly raised after trial, Mr. Harper's argument fails
because he provides no legal basis for his argument as required by the appellate
rules, see In re Estate of Paul, 2007 UT App 389, ,r 17 (holding that a court may
take appropriate measure to sanction a party for his failure to properly argue
his brief, including disregarding an issue not properly briefed) and his
argument is filled with logical fallacies and false premises in any event. A
person who is paid on a task basis, which is clearly permitted under the law,

see, e.g., Utah Code § 34-28-2(1)(a)(i) ("'Wages' means the amounts due the
employee for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on
a time, task, piece, commission basis ..."), is paid by the task, not the hour.
Accordingly, an employee cannot claim he has been denied his promised
payment because it took him longer to complete the task than he expected.
26
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Because there was significant evidence supporting the findings, Mr.
Harper has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that Findings ,r,r 5(a), 6,
35, and 38(a) were against the clear weight of evidence. Additionally, Mr.
Harper's argument regarding the unfairness of the payment raised for the first
time on a motion for a new trial was an improper attempt to raise new theories
on a Rule 52(b) and 59(a)(6) motion, and the law does not support Mr. Harper's
contentions in any event.
C.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, this court should affirm the entry of Findings

,r,r S(a), S(b), 6, 35, and 38(a).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT MR. HARPER
ACTED IN BAD FAITH DURING THE COURSE OF THE LITIGATION.

Mr. Harper next contends that the trial court erred when it found that Mr.
Harper had acted in bad faith during the course of the litigation.
Appellant's Brief at 38-39.) Specifically, he challenges Findings

(See

,r,r 27, 39(a),

39(b), 39(c), and Conclusions ,r 10 and then claims that "[f]inding that Harper
took an unconscionable advantage of Drive Line is clearly erroneous."
(Appellant's Brief at 17.) While Mr. Harper identifies these findings and
conclusions in his statement of the issue, his argument deals exclusively with
the court's finding that Mr. Harper called Ms. Martino and asked her "what she
27
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was willing to pay to make the whole case go away." (Id at 16-17, 36-39.) This
Ci

is a critical oversight.
Utah Code § 78B-5-825(1) authorizes a trial court to award "reasonable
attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith[.]"

"According to the plain language of section [78B-5-825], three

requirements must be met before the court shall award attorney fees: (1) the
party must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the opposing party must be
without merit, and (3) the claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith."
Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In this case, Mr. Harper only challenges the question regarding whether
he brought the claim in bad faith, and "[t]o find that a party acted in 'bad faith,'
the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (i)
The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question;
(ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the
party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question
would hinder, delay, or defraud others." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
316 (Utah 1998); accord Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ,r,r 1112, 122 P.3d 556. Thus, in order to show bad faith, a trial court need only make
a finding of one of the above factors. In its Findings and Order, the trial court
28
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found that Drive Line had proven all three factors in this case. (See R. at 375,

,r,r

39(a)-(c).) Accordingly, even if Mr. Harper's argument had merit with

respect to the one factor he challenges, it would make no difference as to the
finding of bad faith given that the two other factors that Mr. Harper has not
challenged would still justify a finding of bad faith.
Even if Mr. Harper's argument could somehow reverse the bad-faith
finding, Mr. Harper's argument is simply without merit. While acknowledging
that there was testimony that supported the finding that Mr. Harper had "an
intention to take unconscionable advantage of the Respondents ... by filing the
factually baseless claims and then demanding a payment from Kim Martino to
make the wage claim 'go away," Mr. Harper argues only that "[h]ad the Court
~elieved in Harper's testimony and his affidavit, the Court would have not
believed that Harper was attempting to take unconscionable advantage of ...
Ms. Martino." (Appellant's Brief at 38.) This argument, of course, is precisely
the kind of argument that the appellate court's reject when a party challenges
a factual finding-"[w]hen reviewing a bench trial '[appellate courts] accord
deference to the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and
demeanor."' State v. Bingham, 2015 UT App 103, ,r 12, 348 P.3d 730 (quoting
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988).
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As discussed above, when challenging factual findings must do more than
"reargue [his or] her position" from the lower tribunal. Welte, 2011 UT App 46,

,r 4. When courts "review findings of fact for clear error, [they] 'revers[e] only
where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [they]
otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' Grimm, 2018
UT App 115, ,r 12 (citations omitted).
Mr. Harper acknowledges there was evidence upon which the trial court
based its decision. (See Appellant's Brief at 36-38.) While it is true that Mr.
Harper testified that he never made a threat to Ms. Martino, Ms. Martino
testified that he did. (See R. at 643-44.) More significantly, the trial court
explicitly weighed the credibility of Mr. Harper against Ms. Martino and
specifically found that it "finds Ms. Martino's testimony to be credible," and
determined that Mr. Harper did make the threat. (R. at 371, ,r 27.)
Thus, Mr. Harper has failed to meet his burden to establish that the trial
court's finding is against the clear weight of evidence. Drive Line, therefore,
requests that Mr. Harper's appeal be denied.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MR. HARPER'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS AND SANCTIONING MR. HARPER UNDER RULE 37 (a) (8).

Mr. Harper's arguments with respect to the denial of his discovery
requests is scattered and difficult to follow. However, it appears that he is
'1v
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arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to compel
Drive Line to respond to certain discovery requests that Mr. Harper
propounded late in the discovery period. (See Appellant's Brief at 18-19, 3943.)7
"As a general rule, [appellate courts] grant district courts a great deal of
deference in matters of discovery and review discovery orders for abuse of
discretion." Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r 63, 345 P.3d 566. '"The choice of an
appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Rawlings v. Rawlings,
2015 UT 85,

,r

1

13, 358 P.3d 1103 (quoting First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass n v.

Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984)).

In this case, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying Mr.
Harper's motion to compel discovery. On March 2, 2016, soon after the first
answer to Mr. Harper's Petition for Judicial Review was filed, the trial court
entered a document entitled "Notice of Event Due Dates" (Notice) that

Interestingly, Mr. Harper's complaint centers on Drive Line's purported failure
to give him copies of "the trip envelopes" in response to his discovery requests.
(See Appellant's Brief at 18, 40.) However, Mr. Harper had complete copies of
those items since the Wage Claim hearing as they were exhibits in the hearing.
(R. at 1051, Resp. Ex. 5.) Further, the payroll records were provided to him in
the Pretrial Disclosures. (See R. at 273-7 4.) Mr. Harper also briefly complains
about not receiving a copy of the Estes contract but makes no further mention
of it in his argument.
31
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establishing dates

for

discovery

completion

and

completion

dates.

Additionally, the Notice provided that "[t]hese dates will constitute the
schedule for disclosures, fact discovery, expert discovery, ADR and readiness
for trial." It identified the date that "Fact discovery [should be] completed" as
"11-Aug-16." (Rat 38.)
On August 2, 2016, Mr. Harper served a document on Drive Line entitled
"Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents by mail and demanded that "said documents and interrogatories
are to be answered ... within 3 weeks." (R. at 97-100.) On August 23, 2016, Mr.
Harper filed a motion to compel, (R. at 75), to which Drive Line objected
because (1) the discovery requests sought discovery that would be completed
outside of the discovery cut-off, (2) the discovery demanded responses in less
time than permitted by Rules 33(b) and 34(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, (3) the discovery included more interrogatories and requests for
production than permitted by Rule 26(c)(S), and Mr. Harper brought the
motion to compel discovery without complying with Rule 37(a)(1). (R. at 89108.)
On September 2, 2016, the trial court denied the motion to compel by
Minute Entry dated September 2, 2016. (R. at 113-16.) In the Minute Entry, the
trial court stated, inter alia:
32
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... Petitioner's Motion is procedurally improper because it fails to
comply with the basic requirements of Rule 37 .... Rule 37 requires
a party who is alleging a discovery dispute to file a "Statement of
Discovery Issues" with the Court . . . Petitioner's Motion does not
include the necessary elements required by the Rule, including "a
certification that the requesting party has in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer with the other affected parties in person or
by telephone in an effort to resolve the dispute without court
action."
. . . Even if the Motion was procedurally proper, the Motion is
denied on the alternative basis that Petitioner's First Set of
Discovery is untimely.
. . . . While the Court understands that the Petitioner is pro se ...,
the Court cautions Petitioner in this case that frivolous filings or
pleadings could subject Petitioner to sanctions under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure or an award of attorneys' fees.
(R. at 114-15.)

Six days after the court issued this decision, Mr. Harper filed a motion to
enlarge time to complete discovery, claiming that he ''ha[d] experienced
oppositions and objections from the respondents as per discovery requests."
(R. at 117.) Mr. Harper sought an additional 120 days to complete discovery.

(Id.) Mr. Harper included a Statement of Discovery Issues which stated in its
entirety:
Comes Now (sic) the Petitioner and respectfully files this statement
Pursuant (sic) to Rule 37a(l)a (sic), as the Respondents have not
brought forth any of the Petitioner's Discovery Request do (sic)
date pursuant to Rule 26.

33
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(R. at 118.) Drive Line objected raising the same objections it had before when

the trial court had denied the first motion and sought attorney fees. (R. at 12431.)
Undeterred, Mr. Harper filed a motion to amend his petition on
September 16, 2016. (R. at 121-23.) Drive Line objected to that motion because
(1) the motion was untimely, (2) it improperly attempted to add the
shareholders of Energy Enterprises as defendants in violation of Heaps v.
Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, ,r 18, 345 P.3d 655, and (3) it improperly attempted

to add a purported violation of the Federal Motors Carrier Act. Once again,
Drive Line sought its attorney fees. (R. at 144-52.) In an order dated October
19, 2016, the trial court denied the motion to extend discovery and the motion
to amend the petition and granted Drive Line's request for attorney fees
because "the Motion for Extraordinary Discovery and the Motion to Amend lack
a reasonable legal or factual basis." (R. at 184-87 .)
Less than a week later, Mr. Harper filed another motion "to compel the
Respondents to [c]omply with the Petitioners [sic] request for discovery." (R.
at 188.) Drive Line once again objected, joining the Utah Labor Commission's
motion. (Id. at 216-217.) The trial court once again denied Mr. Harper's motion
and warned him about his frivolous filing practices. (Id. at 225-27.)
~
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Mr. Harper's argument on appeal, however, entirely ignores this factual
history and instead focuses on Mr. Harper's unsupported and entirely
irrelevant argument that the "documents [he requested] were relevant and
necessary to" his case. (Appellant's Brief at 43.) Whether documents are
relevant and necessary to a case has no bearing on whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Harper's requests for discovery that are
submitted in violation of the trial court's scheduling orders and the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. "Because the trial judge deals directly with the parties and
the discovery process, he or she has great latitude in determining the most
efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business." A.K & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const, 1999 UT App 87, ,r 36,977 P.2d 518. Judges

are "allow[ed] to impose various sanctions if 'a party . . . fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order."' Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010
UT App 257, ,r 11, 241 P.3d 375 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B)-(C)).
In this case, Mr. Harper clearly violated the trial court's scheduling
orders, minute entries, discovery orders, and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As discussed above, the trial court entered an order establishing dates for
discovery completion and completion dates. It identified, among other things,
the date that "Fact discovery [should be] completed" as "11-Aug-16." The Utah
courts have long held that "it would be inappropriate and untimely under the
35
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to serve a discovery request ... within [28 days] 8
~

of the discovery deadline, because the responding party would not have
adequate time to respond, i.e., to complete discovery in the time permitted by
rule." Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, 'if34, 265 P.3d 139, distinguished on
other grounds, R.O.A General, Inc. v. Dai, 2014 UT App 124,

,r 11 n.5, 327 P.3d

1233.
In this case, the interrogatories and requests for production were served
on August 2, 2016, by mail. Under Rules 33(b) and 34(b)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, a responding party is entitled to twenty-eight days after
service to respond to interrogatories and requests for production. When
discovery is served by mail, the responding party is entitled to an additional

~

three days to respond. Given that Mr. Harper served his discovery request only
nine days before the fact discovery completion date, the requests were

~

untimely. Drive Line filed a timely objection to the requests. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Harper's motion to
compel.

~

8

At the time of the decision, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provided for a
thirty day response time. The Rules have since been amended to twenty-eight
days. Compare Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, 'if34, 265 P.3d 139,
distinguished on other grounds, R.O.A General, Inc. v. Dai, 2014 UT App 124, ,r 11
·n.S, 327 P.3d 1233, with Utah R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), 34 (b)(2).
36
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The trial court's scheduling order also provided that the discovery tier
applicable to this case would be tier 1 under Rule 26(c) (5). Under tier 1, a party
is entitled to use no interrogatories and is only permitted 5 requests for
production. In this case, Mr. Harper propounded nine interrogatories9 and six
requests for production. 10 (See R. at 97-100.) Accordingly, pursuant to Rules
33(b) and 34(b)(2), Mr. Harper's interrogatories and requests for production
violated the rule. Drive Line timely objected to the interrogatories and requests
for production. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Harper's motion to c~mpel.
Moreover, although Rule 37(a)(1) permits a party to seek an order
"compelling discovery," in order to do so he must provide a "[s]tatement of
discovery issues that includes "[a] certification" that he "conferred or
attempted to confer" in good faith to resolve the dispute, include a statement
regarding proportionality, and, "if the statement requests extraordinary
discovery, a statement certifying that the party has reviewed and approved a

Although Mr. Harper did not identify his list of discovery requests as
interrogatories or requests for production, items identified as 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10,
11, B, and C were interrogatories.
10 Although Mr. Harper did not identify his list of discovery requests as
interrogatories or requests for production, items identified as 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and
A were requests for production. Item 6 asked questions and also requested the
production of documents. It is accordingly listed twice.
9
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discovery budget." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). In this case, Mr. Harper did not
provide a statement of discovery issues that included all of the necessary
elements. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Harper's motion to compel.
Not only did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in denying the
motion to compel, but it properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion

~

to extend the discovery deadline. Rule 26(c)(6) allows a party "[t]o obtain
discovery beyond the limits established in paragraph (c) (S)" only "before the
close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery
imposed by these rules" by filing "a request for extraordinary discovery under
Rule 37(a)." Thus, Mr. Harper's motion to extend discovery was improper
because (1) he filed his motion almost a month after the close of standard
discovery and (2) he had not reached the limits of standard discovery before
filing the motion. 11

Additionally, Mr. Harper failed to comply with the

Mr. Harper engages in some equivocation when he claims that because the
trial court held that he "had not reached limits of standard discovery" that the
trial court had concluded that standard discovery was still ongoing. (See
Appellant's Brief at 43.) The trial court's order was clear, however, that Mr.
Harper "waited until after the close of standard discovery" to file his motion to
extend. (See R. at 184.) The reference to "limits of standard discovery" was
clearly referencing the fact that he had not, "before the close of standard
discovery ... reach[ed] the limits of standard discovery," i.e., the number of
interrogatories and requests for production allowed. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(6).
38
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requirements of Rule 37(a)(1) when seeking his extraordinary discovery. Rule
37(a)(1) requires that a certification include, among other things, a
"[s]tatement of discovery issues that includes "[a] certification" that he
"conferred or attempted to confer" in good faith to resolve the dispute, include
a statement regarding proportionality, and, "if the statement requests
extraordinary discovery, a statement certifying that the party has reviewed and
approved a discovery budget"

Utah R Civ. P. 37(a)(2). In this case, Mr.

Harper's statement of discovery issues entirely ignored all of these elements.
Although Mr. Harper appears to have recognized the deficiency by filing a
document entitled "Petitioner's Certification Pursuant to Utah R Civ. P.
37(a)(2)(B)," 12 even this filing did not fully comply as it included no statement
regarding proportionality or that Mr. Harper had reviewed and approved a
discovery budget. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to extend discovery and Mr. Harper's appeal should be
denied.

It bears noting that Mr. Harper's description of the discussion with counsel
for Drive Line was and is still disputed by counsel for Drive Line. (See R. at 128,
12

n.4.)

39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MR. HARPER'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Mr. Harper argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial because he "filed an affidavit in support of his

4t

motion," "testified under penalty of perjury [that] he did not call Ms. Martino ..
. [and did] not . . . attempt to [extort or] take an unconscionable advantage of
Ms. Martino," and "filed a [r]eply to [Drive Line's] opposition" to Mr. Harper's
motion for new trial. (Appellant's Brief at 44.) Thus, Mr. Harper argues, the
trial court must have been wrong when in its order denying the motion for new
trial the court concluded that "Mr. Harper only selectively quotes from portions
of the bench trial and ignores evidence that supports the Court's findings" and

~

"Mr. Harper failed to discuss any of the supporting evidence in his New Trial
Motion." (Id. at 43-44.) Aside from the fact that Mr. Harper's claims regarding
what he did in his motion for new trial actually supports the trial court's
conclusions, the claim is irrelevant to whether the trial court abused its
discretion.
"'[A] large measure of discretion is vested in the trial court in refusing or
granting a motion for new trial on the ground that there is an insufficiency of
evidence to support ... the judgment," when the trial court judge who heard the
motion is the judge who presided over the case. Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT
~

40
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

App 475, ,r,r 5-6, 153 P.3d 768 (quoting Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27
Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972)). Moreover, "'[t]he trial court's
denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence to support
the [decision] was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to
make the [decision] plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id. ,r 8.
In this case, even assuming that Mr. Harper did as he argues in his brief,
he does not argue nor attempt to show that the evidence was so slight or
unconvincing as to make the trial court's decision to deny his motion for new
trial plainly unreasonable and unjust. Mr. Harper even concedes in his brief
that his motion for new trial did "not have many [sic] of the supporting
evidence." (Appellant's Brief at 44.) There was significant and compelling
evidence that supported every finding and conclusion Mr. Harper challenged in
his motion for new trial. (See Rat 755-828.) Accordingly, Mr. Harper's appeal
of the motion for new trial should be denied.

ATTORNEY FEES
Drive Line and Energy Enterprises also respectfully request that they be
awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. This court has repeatedly stated
that '"[w]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the
party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."' 1-D Electric Inc. v.
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Gillman, 2017 UT App 144, ,r 49, 402 P.3d 802 (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at
319).
Moreover, in this case, an award of attorney fees is especially warranted.
As discussed in the fact section above, the trial court awarded attorney fees
against Mr. Harper because of his bad faith litigation tactics, repeatedly warned
him before sanctioning him, and then entered a vexatious litigant order against
him pursuant to Rule 83 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Even after the
order was entered against him, Mr. Harper continued his bad faith litigation
tactics, including presenting "arguments ... to the [trial court that] were
without basis in fact or law" in filings submitted in response to writs of
garnishment that "presented no relevant objections or exemptions." (R. at
1044.)
Moreover, Mr. Harper's conduct in the appellate proceeding has been
similar to his conduct in the trial court below. As this court docket details, on
March 29, 2018, this court sent the parties a briefing schedule that set the time
for the submission of Mr. Harper's brief to be May 8, 2018. Mr. Harper failed to
file a brief on May 8th• Consequently, this court dismissed the case pursuant to
an Order of Dismissal dated May 16, 2018, subject to the condition that Mr.
Harper's appeal would be reinstated if he filed a brief within ten days. Rather
than file a brief, Mr. Harper requested a motion for extension of time on May
42
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18, 2018. The court granted the motion for extension on May 23, 2018,
GFb

ordering Mr. Harper's brief to be filed by June 18, 2018. Before filing that brief,
Mr. Harper requested to supplement the record to include transcripts from the
underlying informal adjudication held at the Wage Claim Division. This court
granted that motion by Order dated June 5, 2018. On June 7, 2018, this court
gave Mr. Harper an additional extension of time to July 17, 2018, to file his
brief. 13 On July 6, 2018, Mr. Harper filed another motion seeking another
extension of time and stating only that "[t]he record has been supplemented
and I need more time to compleat [sic] the brief." This, of course, violated the
requirements of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 22(b).
Moreover, the Appellant's Brief filed by Mr. Harper contains argument
that ignore the standards for appellate review and long-standing precedent of
this court and has simply reargued the same arguments that he repeatedly
presented to the trial court below for which he was sanctioned. Although this
court may be tempted to view this behavior as the simple mistake of a pro se
litigant, as detailed in the record below, besides the vexatious litigant order

13

The Court's letter resetting the briefing schedule states that the "Court Order
of June 5, 2018, ... suspended [the briefing schedule] with directions that the
due date for appellant's brief would be re-established following this Court's
receipt of the necessary supplemental record." However, the June 5, 2018,
Order does not include such language, and, Mr. Harper never requested an
extension for the filing of the brief.
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entered against Mr. Harper entered in this case, Mr. Harper has had two other
vexatious litigant orders entered against him in two other proceedings. (See R.
at 7 40, 748-54.) Accordingly, he is very familiar with the court process and has
been warned repeatedly to stop his improper behavior.
Drive Line does not have unlimited resources to defend itself, yet Mr.
Harper's behavior has unreasonably increased the cost to Drive Line. His
original claim filed with the Wage Claim Division was for slightly less than $800.
Before that date, he had never claimed that Drive Line owed him any money
even though he quit his job two months prior to his filing the claim. It was clear
that he intended to leverage the wage claim into a settlement when he called
Kim Martino and asked her how much she would pay him to make it go away.
His behavior since that date demonstrates that he was fully prepared to carry
through on the implicit threat to cause Drive Line unreasonable legal cost and
disrupt its business.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Drive Line requests that this court conclude
·that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, or, even if it did, to deny Mr.
Harper's appeal. Furthermore, Drive Line requests that it be awarded its
attorney fees and costs in this appeal and remand the case to the trial court for
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Cti

a determination of the reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in this
appeal.
Dated August 22, 2018.

Is I D. Scott Crook
D. Scott Crook
scott@crooktaylorlaw.com
CROOK & TAYLOR LAW PLLC
Attorneys for Respondents Energy
Enterprises, Inc., and Drive Line, LLC

fijj
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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I
certify that the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ~NERGY ENTERPRISES,
~

INC., AND DRIVE LINE, LLC, relying upon the word count function found in

Microsoft Word, the word processing program used in the drafting of the brief,
the brief contains 12,096 words (including the table of contents, table of

~

authorities, and certifications), which is less than the 14,000 word limit set by
Rule 24(g)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Additionally, I have
complied with the requirements of Rule 21(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and this filing contains no non-public information.
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D. Scott Crook
scott@crooktaylorlaw.com
CROOK & TAYLOR LAW PLLC
Attorneys for Respondents Energy
Enterprises, Inc., and Drive Line, LLC
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Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (May 18, 2017)

B

Judgment (September 1, 2017)
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Order Denying New Trial Motion and Granting Vexatious
Litigant Motion (Oct 18, 2017}
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Order, Appellate Case No 20150474-CA (June 26, 2015)
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Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Attorneys'
Fees and Costs (August 3, 2017)
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

BRUCE HARPER,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ENERGY
ENTERPRISES, INC., and DRIVE LINE,
LLC,

Case No. 160901238
Judge James D. Gardner

Res ondents.
A bench trial was held in this matter on March 22, 2017. Petitioner Bruce Harper
appeared before the court and represented himself. Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc., and
Drive Line, LLC also appeared and were represented by D. Scott Crook. Respondent Utah Labor
Commission also appeared and was represented by David M. Wilkins. On or about April 17,
2017, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Court. The
Court, having considered the testimony of the parties and witnesses, received exhibits, heard the
arguments of counsel regarding the issues tried in this case, and for good cause appearing in the
record and in the admitted evidence, hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Order:
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FINDINGS OF FACT

l.

Bruce Harper was hired by Drive Line, LLC (Drive Line), on June I 8, 2014.

2.

On the date of hjs hire, Mr. Harper received a copy of Drive Line's Substance

Abuse Policies and Procedures.
3.

Kim Martino is an ov,mer and officer of Drive Line.

4.

Greg Ostler was the Fleet Manager for Drive Line at all relevant times.

5.

Prior to being hired, Mr. Harper interviewed with Greg Ostler. The Court finds

credible the testimony of Mr. Ostler that he explained Drive Line's compensation policies to Mr.
Harper. The Court finds the following was the agreed upon compensation between Mr. Harper
and Drive Line:
a

Drive Line and Mr. Harper agreed that Mr. Harper would be paid $.36 per

mile (which consisted of a base rate of $.27 per mile~ plus $.09 per mile per-diem). This
compensation was split in half when working with a team driver. Drivers could also earn
an additional $.02 per mile incentive for meeting certain goals on an individual basis, and
an additional $.02 per mile bonus for meeting certain goals on a team basis.
b.

Drive Line and Mr. Harper agreed that on certain routes that Mr. Harper

would be compensated for a fixed amount of mileage no matter the actual distance
driven. This compensation was pursuant to a contract that Drive Line had with another

company named Estes. The fixed mileage for the route from ;saJt Lake City, Utah, to
Toledo, Ohio was 1,626 trip miles.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0364

~

c.

On days when a driver was driving locally (rather than on a long-haul) or

attending training, Drive Line and Mr. Harper agreed that he would be compensated on
an hourly rate of between $10 to $18 per hour, depending on the type of work being
performed.
6.

The Court finds that the compensation arrangements as testified to by Mr. Ostler

was the agreed upon wages between the parties.
7.

Every pay period, Drive Line mailed Mr. Harper (a) a pay statement, (b) a

docwnent entitled "Employee Pay Sheet," and, if applicable (c) a hand-written time card. Mr.
Harper acknowledged that he received all of these documents after they were mailed.
a.
Q

The pay statements included the number of miles driven and/or hours

worked for non-long haul driving and the regular and per diem rates paid based on those
miles and/or hours.
b.

Every Employee Pay Sheet included the name of Drive Line at the top.

The Employee Pay Sheet identified every trip by trip number and for every long haul trip,

it included the amount of mileage credited to the driver, the amoW1t paid at the regular
mileage rate and the amount paid at the per diem mileage rate. It also identified the
number of hours driven on non-long haul matters, the rate of pay, and the total amount
paid. Finally, if an employee had earned any incentives for past trips, the Employee Pay
Sheet identified the trip and mileage qualifying for the incentive.
8.

Sometime after Mr. Harper began working for Drive Line, Drive Line began

offering a longevity bonus. The Court finds that the longevity bonus was not offered to Mr.
Harper at the time of his employment. The longevity bonus provided that a driver who worked a
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0365

~

requisite number of months with Drive Line as a full-time driver was entitled to a bonus. The
bonus was as follows:

9.

Months of Service

Bonus Amount

6

$500

12

$500

18

$500

24

$500

30

$500

36

$500

42

$1,000

48

$1,000

The Court finds that Drive Line did not offer a sign-on bonus to Mr. Harper at the

~

time he was hired.
10.

The Court finds credible the testimony of Mr. Ostler that Drive Line did not offer

sign-on bonuses.
11.

Mr. Harper never made a claim that he was owed any money during the time that

he was employed by Drive Line.
12.

During the time that Drive Line employed Mr. Harper, neither Ms. Martino nor

Mr. Ostler received any demand for additional payment from Mr. Harper.
13.

Mr. Harper presented no evidence that he ever made a demand to anyone at Drive

~

Line for wages he was owed but not paid during his employment tenure.

4
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14.

In text messages that were exchanged between Mr. Harper and Mr. Ostler from

. September 3, 2014, to September 9, 2014, Mr. Harper never claimed that (a) he was owed more

money for the mileage he had driven, (b) he should have been compensated for actual mileage
rather than route mileage, or (c) he should be paid a sign-on bonus. The text messages evidence
only that Mr. Harper wanted to renegotiate the pay he was receiving.

15.

Although Mr. Harper claims that the text messages provided to the Court during

the trial did not include a complete record of the text messages exchanged between Mr. Ostler

and Mr. Harper, Mr. Harper never disputed the content or accuracy of the text messages that
were supplied. Additionally, Mr. Harper never claimed that any text message allegedly not
provided contained any claim to being owed any additional wages-he claimed only that they
included complaints about safety conditions or co-drivers. 1 Specifically, the Court references the
following text messages as support for these findings:
a

On September 3, 20 I 4, Mr. Harper inquired about when his "probation

time [was] compleat2 as far as becoming an owner."
b.

On September 5 th , Mr. Harper followed up on his earlier text message:

"Was u able to figure my probation time to become an owner op.?" Mr. Ostler responded,

1

Because these allegations are not relevant to Mr. Harper's wage claim, the Court makes no finding as to
whether any safety violations occurred. The Court notes that testimony from Mr. Ostler and Ms. Martino
disputed these claims.
2

Because text messages are often written in haste without conforming to grammatical or spel1ing
conventions, all text messages will be quoted as typed without interlineation of sic to identify any spelling
or gramatical errors.

s
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explaining that Mr. Harper was eligible at three or six months depending on "how much

you want to put down on the truck."
C.

Mr. Harper responded with "O. Ok. So lets negoicate. . Thats if the co.

Still Wants me? Loi''.
d.

The following day, September 6, 2014, Mr. Harper followed up again:

"'What information did kim give u?" Mr. Ostler did not immediately respond to this
inquiry.
e.

On September 7, 2014, before Mr. Ostler had responded to the inquiry

sent the day before, Mr. Harper sent another text message to Mr. Ostler in which he
stated:
Before i go back out on wednesday ineed to resolve and renegociate terms.
U stated my income would be.40 a mile .. It is currently .38 a mile .. I
want .45 a mile. I need to b paid on actual traveled miles. 1716 a trip.. I
want to be assigned truck 33 .. If i am with a co. Driver who is unable to
do thier half of miles i will recieve the difference of90 miles (1716 to
1626) to my check.
f.

On September 8, 2014, Mr. Ostler responded to Mr. Ostler's multiple

demands and questions. In response to Mr. Harper's demand for different payment terms
for his trips, Mr. Ostler stated:
The only drivers with a .40 base have been with us over a year-all drivers
start at .36 with incentives available via safety, operation and very soon
fuel bonus' -u are about due for your revue when if you are meeting
satandards could see raise to .37 plus incentives.

6
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GI

In response to this text message, Mr. Harper stated, "U have my terms. It

g.

is obvious that to u i am not worth those terms i will seek new employment or talk with
~

kim about the truck purchase. I have the down payment avilabl."

h.

After Mr. Ostler refused to negotiate Mr. Harper's demands for different

mileage payment terms, Mr. Harper stated, "Ok. Will u inform steve for me".
When Mr. Ostler inquired further about what Mr. Harper wanted Mr.

1.

Ostler to tell Steve, Mr. Ostler wrote another text message at 8:22 a.m on September 9th:
Please let Steve know ASAP if you are talcing load with Mike Chadwick
tonight at 2 am-he needs to give as much notice as possible for Estes if
you aren't going to stay with us-we also need fuel card for 32, we had to
rob another truck and change it's# this morning-thanks Bruce.... You
can drop by office or if you are going out tonight just drop in mailbox at
yard-thanks again.
Three and half hours later, Mr. Harper texted Mr. Ostler telling him, "I put

J.

the fuel card in shed.''
16.

The Court finds that Ivir. Harper was not terminated from Drive Line, but instead

that be quit his job.
17.

During his three-month tenure of employment with Drive Line, Mr. Harper was

paid a total of$} 1,315.64.
Pay Period

Payday

June 16-June 29, 2014

July 3, 2014

$1,283.22

June 30-July 13, 2014

July 18, 2014

$1,821.00

July 14-July 27, 2014

August 1, 2014

$1,555.44

Amount

7
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Pay Period

Payday

July 28 - August 10, 2014

August 15, 2014

$2,363.24

August 11 - August 24, 2014

August 29, 2014

$1,866.26

August 25 - September 7, 2014

September 12, 2014

$2,406.48

Amount

~

TOTAL:
18.

$11,315.64

The Court finds that the payments made to Mr. Harper as identified above were

full payment of all wages owed to Mr. Harper for his work and that Mr. Harper has failed to
prove that Drive Line owes him any unpaid wages.

19.

Mr. Harper filed a wage claim on November 6, 2014. Mr. Harper's wage claim

specifically demands payment of only $796.25 for "unpaid wages." He indicated he was seeking
$0 for "Unpaid Bonus," $0 for ''Unauthorized Deductions," and $0 for "Other Unpaid Wages."
Bruce Harper affixed his electronic signature to this docwnent in which he stated, "I . . . swear

that the information contained in this form is true to the best of my knowledge."
20.

The Court finds that the wage claim included the fol1owing false or incorrect

statements:
a.

Mr. Harper's employer was Energy Enterprises.

b.

Mr. Harper stated that he started employment on April 5, 2014.

c.

Mr. Harper stated that the "First Date of Owed Wages" was May 14, 2014.

d.

Mr. Harper stated he did not quit.

e.

Mr. Harper stated that he was paid $22.75 per hour.

f.

Mr. Harper stated that he had not been paid for 35 hours of work.

~

~

8
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21.

A]though Mr. Harper claimed in trial that he intended to correct these false or

incorrect statements when an investigator contacted him, he knew that the statements were false
or incorrect at the time he affixed his signature to the wage claim.
22.

The Court finds that when Mr. Harper filed his wage claim that he had

docwnentation (including monthly pay statements) that showed he started work in June 2014 and
not in April 2014.

23.

AdditionaJly, the Court finds that Mr. Harper knew that his employer was Drive

Line and he also knew that he quit h.is job.
24.

After filing the wage claim, Mr. Harper sent a text to Mr. Ostler on that same date

in which he stated: "Are you or energy going to pay me for my miles driven through Michigan.',
25.

He also called Kim Martino on that same date and told her that "he had not been

paid for the 'extra miles' for the Toledo ... loads.~'
26.

Prior to November 6, 2014, the Court finds that Mr. Harper had not made any

claim to Drive Line as to any specific amounts owed to him for his work. Additionally, on

November 6, 2014, it appears that Mr. Harper's sole claim was for allegedly not being paid for
miles or hours of work that he claimed he should have been paid for on the Toledo to Salt Lake
City routes.
27.

Sometime after Drive Line filed its "Employer's Response," Mr. Harper had

another telephone conversation with Ms. Martino. Ms. Martino testified at trial that in that

telephone conversation, Mr. Harper asked Ms. Martino how much she was willing to pay to
make the wage claim go away. The Court finds Ms. Martino's testimony to be credible.

9
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28.

On February 5, 2015, in response to Drive Line's answer to Mr. Harper's wage

claim, Mr. Harper, for the first time, claimed he shouJd have been paid $.46 per mile, a $5,000
sign-on bonus, and a flat-fee and a percentage of the Estes contract.
29.

~

During the Wage Claim Hearing held on Mr. Harper's wage claim, Mr. Harper

sought only reimbursement for unpaid mileage on the Toledo route, $.46 per mile for the mileage
driven on the Toledo route, and a $5,000 sign on bonus. (See Order of Dismissal, Wage Claim
No. 15-00862 (April 22, 20 I 5), appended to Petition for Judicial Review of FinaJ Agency
Action.)
30.

During the Wage Claim Hearing, Mr. Harper argued that "Drive Line never

actually tenninated his employment and for all he knew they still employed him. Ergo Mr.
Harper reasoned that as he ostensibly remained employed by Drive Line, he should be paid the
appropriate installments of the 'Longevity Bonus."' (See id. at 4.)
31.

On April 22, 2015, the Wage and Hour Division dismissed Mr. Harper's claims
~

with prejudice.
32.

In Mr. Harper's Petition for Judicial Review of Final Agency Action filed with

this Court on February 19, 2016, Mr. Harper asserted claims for $5,846.00 in claims for "dispute
over unpaid wages & [inappropriate] deductions on the petitioner['s] checks." (Petition for

Judicial Review of Final Agency Action~ 4.)
33.

On March 14, 2017, one week before trial, Mr. Harper submitted a trial brief, in

which, for the first rime in the entire two year history of rus wage claim, he claimed, (a) he was

owed $300 for aJlegedly not being reimbursed for a fuel payment and (b) he was owed an
additional $300 from his wages. Just one day before the trial, Mr. Harper informed counsel he
10
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was withdra'Aring those claims. In addition, Mr. Harper claimed, despite his wage claim filing,

that his employment had been "inappropriately tenninated."
34.

The Court finds that Mr. Harper has not met his burden in this case that he is

owed any money from Drive Line.
35.

The Court finds that Drive Line has paid Mr. Harper all amounts that he was

owed based on his employment.
36.

The Court finds that Energy Enterprises, Inc. and Drive Line are the prevailing

parties in this litigation.
3 7.

Although Mr. Harper is representing himself in this matter and some deference is

given to pro se litigants, the Court nevertheless finds that Mr. Harper filed a nwnber of frivolous
or borderline frivolous filings during the course of this litigation. Specifically, the Court finds the
following filings were not filed in good faith:

a

On or about March 14, 2016, Mr. Harper filed a Motion to Disqualify

Defendant's Council (sic) (UALD) and Petitioner's Request for Utah States Council (sic)
and Representation, which this Court denied ruling that '"Petitioner has failed to provide a
sufficient legal or factual basis to disqualify the Attorney General's Office." (Minute
Entry (July 12, 2016).)
b.

On or about August 2, 2016, Mr. Harper served Interrogatories and

Requests for Production demanding that the Respondents answer and respond "within

three weeks" and then filed a motion to compel on August 26, 2016, which this Court
denied (i) ruling that (a) "Petitioner's Motion is procedurally improper because it fails to
comply with the basic requirements of Rule 37 of the [URCP]," and (b) ''Petitioner's
11

C£>
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First Set of Discovery is untimely," and (ii) cautioning Mr. Harper "'that frivolous filings
or pleadings could subject Petitioner to sanctions under the [URCP] or an award of
attorneys' fees. (Minute Entry (Sept. 2, 2016).)
c.

On or about September 8, 2016, Mr. Harper filed a Motion to Extend Time

for Petitioner to Complete Disscovery (sic), which this Court denied ruling that Mr.
Harper "fail[ ed] to comply with the certification requirements in Rule 3 7" and that the
motion was "untimely," and awarding Drive Line attorney fees because the motion
"lacked a reasonable legal or factual basis" and was, therefore, frivolous.

(See Order

(Oct. 19, 2016) & Order on Request for Attorney Fees (Dec. 16, 2016).)
d.

On or about September 16, 2016, Mr. Harper filed a Motion to Amend

Petition, which this Court denied ruling that the motion was untimely, and that "the
proposed amendments . . . fail(ed] to set forth legally cognizable claims and [sought]
relief that is not available, and awarding Drive Line attorney fees because the motion
lacked a reasonable legal or factual basis and was, therefore, frivolous. (See Order (Oct.
19, 2016) & Order on Request for Attorney Fees (Dec. 16, 2016).)
e.

On or about October 25, 2016, Mr. Harper filed yet another Motion to

Compel Disclosure, which this Court denied, holding that "[t ]he motion fail[ ed] to
comply with the [URCP]" and "appear[ ed] to seek the same relief that Petitioner sought
in his previous'~ motions and again cautioning the Petitioner "that additional :frivolous

filing may result in sanctions."
38.

The Court finds that Mr. Harper's claims in this case are without merit.

12
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a.

Mr. Harper testified that he agreed, at the time he was hired, to be

compensated at a flat rate for all trips to Toledo on the Estes Contract.

b.

Mr. Harper's own text messages make clear that he never believed that he

was entitled to $.46 per mile as claimed in this case.
c.

Mr. Harper never believed he was entitled to a $5,000 sign-on bonus.

There was no credible testimony that Drive Line ever offered a $5,000 sign-on bonus. In
fac~ the only $5,000 bonus testified about at the hearing was a longevity bonus that was
instituted after Mr. Harper was hired.
39.

Based upon the foregoing findings, this Court finds that, in pursuing this appeal of

his wage claim, Mr. Harper brought this action in bad faith. Specifically,
a.

Mr. Harper did not honestly believe in the propriety of his claims at the

time that he filed them;

b.

Mr. Harper had an intention to take unconscionable advantage of the

Respondents in this case by filing the factually baseless claims and then demanding a
payment from Kim Martino to make the wage claim "go away;" and
c.

Mr. Harper had an intention and knowledge that by filing this wage claim

and the other frivolous pleadings in this case would have the effect of hindering,

delaying, and defrauding the Respondents in this action.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters the fo1Jowing Conclusions
of Law:
This Court has jurisdiction over this case and venue is proper.

13
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2.

Mr. Harper filed this matter as an appeal of a wage claim filed with the Utah

Wage Claim Division of the Utah Labor Commission pursuant to the Payment of Wages Act,

Utah Code Ann. §§34-28-1 to -I 9. After an infonnal adjudicative proceeding held before an
administrative law judge at the Wage Claim Division, Mr. Harper's wage claim was dismjssed.
He filed this appeal pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R610-3- I 3 and Utah Code § 63G-4-402.
rd

(See Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Action, Utah 3 Dist. Court Case No. 160901238

(February 26, 2016).) This Court has jurisdiction to "award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.

H

Id § 630-4-404( I )(a). Since the Payment of Wages

statute entitles an individual to pursue claims for unpaid wages only, see Utah Code § 34-28-9,
Mr. Harper's claim is limited to a trial de nova on the issue of whether he is entitled to the wages
he claimed under the Payment of Wages Act. Wages are defined by the statute to mean "the
amounts due the employee for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a
time, task, piece, commission or other method of calculating such amount.'' Id. § 34-28-2(l)(i).
3.

Mr. Harper had the burden to prove that his employer failed to pay him ~-amounts

due ... for [his] labor or service."
4.

Drive Line was Mr. Harper's only employer under the statute. Energy Enterprises,

Inc., was not Mr. Harper's employer.

5.

Mr. Harper did not prove that he was owed any unpaid wages for the services he

performed.

6.

Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc., and Drive Line are the prevailing parties in

this litigation.

14
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7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825( 1) authorizes the court to award "reasonable

attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action

was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1).
"According to the plain language of section [78B-5-825], three requirements must be met before
the court shall award attorney fees: (1) the party must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the
opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the claim must not be brought or asserted in good
faith." Hermes

Assocs.

v.

Park's

Sportsman, 813

P.2d

1221,

1225

(Utah Ct.

App.

1991) (citingCadyv. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 1983)).
8.

"To determine whether a claim is \.vithout merit, [the court] look[s] to whether it

was frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Matthews v.

Olympus Const., LC, 2009 UT 29,

,r 30, 215

P.3d 129 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

As set forth above, Mr. Harper's claim had no basis in law or fact and the Court determines that

it was brought without merit.

9.

A finding of bad faith requires "a factual determination of a party's subjective

intent." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998). To find that a party acted in

bad faith, the court must conclude that at least one of the following factors existed: (i) The party
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to
take W1cooscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the
~

knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Id. at 316. As
set forth above, the Court finds each of these factors present in this case.

15
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10.

Thus, pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-5-825(1), the Court determines that Mr.

Harper filed his wage claim in bad faith and that Respondents are entitled to their reasonable
attorney's fees in defense of this action.
11.

As the prevailing party, Respondents are also entitled to an award of costs. See

Utah R. Civ. P. 54.

12.

The Court reserves a determination of the amount of attorney's fees and costs

Respondents are entitled to in this action. Within fourteen (14) days of this order, Respondents
shall file and serve a request and an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs in compliance with
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure setting forth the amount of attorney's fees and
costs being sought. The briefing on any such motion will proceed in compliance with the rules of
civil procedure.
13.

After a determination of the amount attorney's fees and costs, the Court will

direct Respondents to submit a form of a judgment consistent with these preceding Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14.

This is the order of the Court, and no further order is required with respect to the

issues set forth herein.

DATED this 16th day of May, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

James D. Gardner
DISTRICT JUDGE
fu,

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0378

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160901238 by the method and on the date specified.

MAIL:
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D SCOTT CROOK 2150 S 1300 E STE 500 SALT
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UT 84111
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
._
Dated: September 01, 2017
Isl JAl\.1ES GAR:QNER :
04:45:56 PM
District-.~ou"rt Judge/

~

D. Scott Crook (7495)
scott@crooktaylorlaw.com
CROOK & TAYLOR LAW PLLC
2150 South 1300 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 326-1943
Facsimile: (801) 665-1567

Attorneys for Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc., and Drive Line, LLC
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-WEST ORDAN
BRUCE HARPER,

JUDGMENT
Petitioner,

vs.

Case Number 160901238
Judge James Gardner

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ENERGY
ENTERPRISES, INC., and DRIVE LINE, LLC,
Res ondents.

This matter came before the Court for trial on March 22, 2017. Petitioner, Bruce
Harper, was present and represented himself. The Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc.,
and Drive Line, LLC, were present and were represented by D. Scott Crook of Crook and
Taylor Law PLLC. The Respondent Utah Labor Commission was represented by David M.
Wilkins, Assistant Utah Attorney General. Having heard the arguments of counsel and the
testimony of witnesses and the exhibits admitted in open Court, having entered its Order
~

on Request for Attorney Fees on December 16, 2016, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on May 17, 2017, and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Attorney
Fees and Costs on August 3, 2017, and for other good cause, the Court hereby ENTERS
JUDGMENT against Petitioner, and in favor of Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc., and
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Drive Line, L.L.C. in the total amount of $16,285.00, plus statutory post-judgment interest
in the amount of 2.87% per annum pursuant to Utah Code§ 15-1-4.

*** The Court's seal and signature is found on the top of the first page***
Approved as to Form:

Bruce Harper
jeneannehulce@yahoo.com
Petitioner, Pro Se

Isl David M. Wilkins
(Signed by D. Scott Crook with permission of David M. Wilkins)
David M. Wilkins
dwilkins@utah.gov
Attorneys for Respondent Utah Labor Commission
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21 st day of August, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the
(proposed) JUDGMENT to be served by email and mail to Bruce Harper at the address below and
by email to David M. Wilkins, and again served this document after filing on the 1st day of
September, 2017, as follows:
By filing with the Court's Electronic filing system as follows:

David M. Wilkins
dwilkins@utah.gov
Sean Reyes
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO Box 140857
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
By United States Mail, Postage Prepaid, and email to the following:
Bruce Harper
jeneannehulce@yahoo.com
5308 Cygnus Hill Cove
WestJordan,Utah 84081

Is I D. Scott Crook
ij)

D. Scott Crook
scott@crooktaylorlaw.com
CROOK & TAYLOR LAW PLLC

Attorneys for Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc.,
and Drive Line, LLC
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Return of Electronic Notification

Recipients
D SCOTT CROOK - Notification received on 2017-09-01 16:46:41.727.

Ct

DAVID M WILKINS - Notification received on 2017-09-01 16:46:41.643.
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...... IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION .....
NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING [NEF]

A filing has been submitted to the court RE: 160901238
Judge:
JAMES GARDNER

Official File Stamp:

09-01-2017: 16:46:06

Court:

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
District

G,

Salt Lake

Case Title:

HARPER BRUCE vs. UTAH LABOR
COM ISSION, et al.

Document(s) Submitted:

Judgment

Filed by or in behalf of:

JAMES GARDNER

This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
@

The following people were served electronically:
D SCOTT CROOK for ENERGY ENTERPRISES,
DRIVE LINE
DAVID M WILKINS for UTAH LABOR
COMISSION, ENERGY ENTERPRISES, DRIVE
LINE, BRUCE HARPER

The following people have not been served electronically by the Court. _Therefore, if service
is required, they must be served by traditional means:

~
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

~

BRUCE HARPER,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER
Case No. 160901238

UTAH LABOR CONLMISSION, DRIVE LINE
LLC, ENERGY ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Judge Jarnes D. Gardner

Respondents.

THIS .MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Bruce Harper's Motion for a New Trial
(New Trial Motion) and Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc. and Drive Line, LLC's Motion for
Vexatious Litigant Order (Rule 83 Motion). The parties briefed the issues and the Court
determines that a hearing would not substantially assist the Court in resolving the pending
motions. Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the arguments of Mr. Harper and
counsel for Respondents, the Court now issues the following Order.
The New Trial Motion is DENIED. Mr. Harper argues that several of the Courfs findings
in its Findings of Fact, .Conclusions of Law, and Order entered on May 17, 2017 are not
supported by sufficient evidence. But Mr. Harper only selectively quotes from portions of the
bench trial and ignores evidence that supports the Court's findings. Respondents have provided a
detailed recitation of the evidence in support of the challenged findings in their opposition
memorandum. The Court sees no reason to include it here, especially where :Mr. Harper failed to
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discuss any of the supporting evidence in his New Trial Motion. The Court concludes that Mr.
Harper has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Rule 52 or Rule 59 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Rule 83 Motion is GRANTED. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence

that Mr. Harper is a vexatious litigant and there is no reasonable probability that Mr. Harper will
prevail on his claim or any potential post-trial motion. 1 Specifically, the Court finds that Mr.
Harper has filed the following unmeritorious pleadings or papers in this action: (1) Petition for
Judicial Review of Final Agency Action filed on February 19, 2016; (2) Motion to Disqualify
Defendant's Council [sic] (UALD) and Petitioner's Request for Utah States Council [sic] and
Representation filed on March 14, 2016; (3) Motion to Compel filed on August 23, 2016; (4)
Motion to Amend Petition fi1ed on September 16, 2016; (5) Motion to Compel Disclosure filed
on October 25, 2016; and (6) Motion for a New Trial filed on August 28, 2017. Each of these
papers was filed without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Moreover, as the Court has previously
found, this action was brought by Mr. Harper with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud the
Respondents. The Court further finds that Mr. HaIJJer has conducted a pattern of unnecessary and
frivolous discovery practices throughout this litigation that the Court has routinely denied. Mr.
Harper's discovery tactics advanced his objective of harassing the Respondents.
Based on finding Mr. Harper a vexatious litigant, the Court hereby orders that before
filing any additional motions, or requesting from this Court any relief related to his initial claim
1

Mr. Harper, of course, has already lost his claim. But the Court shares Respondents' concern that Mr.
Harper will continue to file post-trial motions in an effort to harass and drive up costs for Respondents.
The Court finds that any post-trial motion brought by Mr. Harper has no reasonable chance for success.
2
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'i
or the supplemental proceedings, Mr. Harper must obtain legal counsel.2 See Utah R. Civ. P.
qjj

83(b)(3). The Court directs its clerks to not enter any motions submitted for filing in this action

by Mr. Harper without legal coW1sel. The Court declines to impose any additional sanctions or
attorney's fees against Mr. Harper at this time.
Cj

DATED this 18th day of October, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

~

This requirement does not prevent Mr. Harper from responding to any motions filed by Respondents or
from pursuing his appellate rights.
2

3
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UT 84114
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

~

JUN 2 6 2015

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
---00000---

)
)
)

ORDER

LABOR COMMISSION,

)
)

Appellate Case No. 20150474-CA

Respondent.

)

BRUCE HARPER,

Petitioner,
V.

)

This matter is before the court on its own motion to transfer the petition for
review pursuant to rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 44 states; in part:

If ... a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but is pursued in an
appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the appellate
court, either on its own motion or on motion of any party, shall transfer
the case, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders, and
a copy of the docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the
case.
Id. Transfer is appropriate in this case, because the petition for review was timely filed,
but it is within the appellate jurisdiction of the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A5-102(7)(a)(2012). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for review is
transferred to the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department.

Dated this

'lJo~day of June, 2015.

FOR THE COURT:

~Cl-~~~
Lisa A. Collins
Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
was deposited in the United States mail or was sent by electronic mail to be delivered

to:
D. SCOTT CROOK
ARNOLD & CROOK PLLC

2150 S 1300 E STE 500

SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106
BRUCE HARPER
5308 CYGNUS HILL COVE
W JORDAN UT 84081
JACESON R MAUGHAN
LABOR COMMISSION
jacesonmaughan@utah.gov
LABOR COMMISSION
ATTN: SARA DANIELSON
sdanielson@utah.gov

By~'-"'-"-'U<...:....a...;....z...>L.>L...i<....p,~~~:.i,._~-

Breeanna Degarmo
Judicial Assistant

Case No. 20150474
LABOR COMMISSION, 15-00862
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THIRD l;)fSTRICT COURT

AUG O3 2017
WEST JOROA~,--DEPT.
TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

BRUCE HARPER,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER ON
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

vs.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, ENERGY
ENTERPRISES, INC., and DRIVE LINE,

Case No. I 60901238

LLC,

~

Judge James D. Gardner
Respondents.

On May 17, 2017, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May

2017 Findings) in this matter. In its May 2017 Findings, the Court ruled C(that pursuant to Utah
Code § 78~-_5-825(1 ), the Court detennines that Mr. Harper filed his wage claim in bad faith and

that Respondents are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees in defense of this action." The
Court also ruled that "[a]s the prevailing party, Respondents are also entitled to an award of
costs." (May 2017 Findings.) Respondents subsequently filed separate motions seeking
attorneys' fees and costs. Mr. Harper filed oppositions to the motions and after the motions were
fully briefed, a Request to Submit was filed with the Court on June 27, 2017. No party requested
oral argument on the pending motions and the Court determines that oral argument would not
.

substantially assist the Court in resolving the motions. The Court, having considered the
arguments of the parties, and for good cause appearing in the record, hereby makes the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 19, 2017, Petitioner Bruce Harper filed a Petition for JudiciaJ

Review of Agency Action (Petition).
2.

On March 22, 2017, a bench trial was held in this matter.

3.

In its May 2017 Findings, the Court ruled in favor of the Respondents and against

the Petitioner and held "that pursuant to Utah Code § 788-5-825(1 ), the Court determines that

Mr. Harper filed his wage claim in bad faith and that Respondents are entitled to their reasonable
attorney's fees in defense of this action." The Court also ruled that "[a]s the prevailing party,
Respondents are also entitled to an award of costs.,,

Enterprises, Inc. and Ori ve Line. LLC' s Fees and Costs
4.

On May 23, 2017, Respondents Energy Enterprises, Inc. and Drive Line, LLC

(collectively, Energy Enterprises) filed their Motion for Attorney Fees seeking $21,920.00 in
attorney's fees since March 17, 2015.

1

Energy Enterprises' motion was supported by the

Declaration of D. Scott Crook in Support of Attorney Fees (First Crook Declaration). The First
Crook Declaration included a detailed breakdown and description of time spent and work
perfom1ed for each person who performed the work. Energy Enterprises clid not seek any costs as

part of its motion.

5.

In his opposition to Energy Enterprises' motion, .Mr. Harper argued that (1)

Energy Enterprises was only awarded fees in this action, and not in the underlying administrative
1

This amount includes $1,375 in attorney's fees that had previously been awarded to Respondents
pursuant to the Court's December 16, 2016 Order on Request for Attorney Fees. Although this order was
certified as final, it does not appear that a judgment was ever entered on this previous award of fees.•

2
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Gj

proceeding; (2) Energy Enterprises did not seek fees in the underlying administrative proceeding;
and (3) Energy Enterprises did not need counsel in the underlying administrative proceeding.

6.

Gj

In its reply memorandum, Energy Enterprises argues that it is entitled to fees in

the underlying administrative proceeding. In the alternative, Energy Enterprises submitted a
Supplemental Declaration of D. Scott Crook in Support of Attorney Fees (Second Crook
Declaration) that "separates out the attorney fees incurred for representation that occurred prior
to this appeal of the administrative proceeding.'' The Second Crook Declaration seeks
"$14,910.00 for wiawarded fees spent in defense of this claim'' since the filing of Mr. Harper's
Petition before this Court.

7.

The Court finds that Energy Enterprises is entitled to $14,910.00 in attorney's

fees for the work performed in this action.

8.

The Court finds that Energy Enterprises is not entitled to recover any attorney's

fees from this Court related to the underlying administrative proceeding. More specifically, the
Court finds that the award of fees as ordered in its May 2017 Findings only related to the
proceedings before this Court, and did not include fees that may have been expended before the
Petition was filed.2 Furthermore, as set forth below, the Court finds $14,910.00 to be a
reasonable fee award.

2

Moreover, it is unclear to the Court whether section 78B-5-825 would even authorize an award offees
for work performed in the administrative proceeding. Section 78B-5-825 authorizes attorney fees only in
"civil actions" where ''the court detenn ines that the action ... was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith.'~ (Emphasis added.) And a civil action is typically understood as a proceeding
brought in court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."');
see also State v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112, ~ 12 ( distinguishing between an 11 administrative action" 'and a
11
civil action"). The Court, of course, need not answer this particular question because the Court's May
3
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9.

Rule 73(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for

attorney fees "must be supported by an affidavit or declaration that reasonably describes the time
spent and work perfonned, including for each item of work the name, position (such as attorney,
paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of the persons who performed the work."
10.

Here, the Court finds that the First and Second Crook Declarations meets all the

requirements set forth in Rule 73. Specifically, the First and Second Crook Declarations include
a detailed chart outlining a description of the time spent and work performed by each attorney
and/or paralegal on this matter.
11.

Mr. Harper did not challenge the fee request based on the difficulty of this

litigation, the amount involved in the case and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved. The Court finds that the fees charged in this case correspond with the difficulty of this
litigation,3 the amount at issue in the case and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.

12.

Mr. Harper did not challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rates of the

attorneys or the paralegal set forth in the Fee Affidavit and the Court finds their hourly rates to
be reasonable and consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services.

2017 Findings only considered and awarded fees for defending against the action brought before this
Court.
3

Although the case was not particularly complex, Mr. Harper did make the case more complex by
changing his theories and by filing a number of motions. Also, the amount in controversy shifted
significantly during the litigation.
4
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13.

Setting aside Mr. Harper's challenge to the fees expended in the underlying

administrative proceeding, which was addressed above, Mr. Harper did not challenge the
reasonableness of the hours spent by Energy Enterprises' attorney in this case. The Court finds
that the amount of time spent by Energy Enterprises' attorney on the task set forth in the First
and Second Crook Declarations (removing those entries that were prior to the filing of the
~

Petition), as well as the total amount of time spent, is reasonable. The Court has reviewed the
time entries set forth in the First and Second Crook Declarations and the Court finds that Energy
Enterprises' attorney perfonned the work and that the work performed and the total hours spent
after the filing of the Petition were reasonable and necessary to defend Energy Enterprises in this
action.
14.

For these reasons, the Court fmds Energy Enterprises is entitled to recover

$14,910.00 in attorney fees for the work performed in this action.

4

Utah Labor Commission's Fees and Costs
15.

On May 24, 2017, Respondent Utah Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and

Labor Division (UALD) filed its Rule 73 Motion for Attorney's Fees and Supporting
Memorandum seeking $4,750.00 in attorney's fees since February 2016. UALD's motion was
supported by the Declaration of David M. Wilkins in Support of Attorney Fees (Wilkins
Declaration). Unlike the Crook Declarations, however, the Wilkins Declaration did not include a

4

It is the Court's understanding that the $14,910.00 includes the $ I ,375.00 in attorney's fees that had
previously been awarded to Energy Enterprises pursuant to the Court's December 16, 2016 Order on
Request for Attorney Fees. To the extent that it does not include the $1,375.00, that amount should be
added to the judgment for Energy Enterprises.
5
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breakdown and description of time spent and work performed for each person who performed the
work. UALD did not seek any costs as part of their motion.

16.

In ms opposition to UALD's motion, among other arguments, Mr. Harper argued

that the Wilkins Declaration "is not sufficiently detailed for proper evaluation of what constitutes
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter and therefore the Attorney General motion should be
denied as being insufficiently supported." UALD declined to file a reply or a supplemental
declaration providing the Court any more information about the work performed by UALD's
attorneys.

ii
17.

The Court agrees with Mr. Harper and finds that the Wilkins Declaration fails to

comply with Rule 73(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it fails to "reasonably
describes the time spent and work performed, including for each item of work the name, position
(such as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of the persons who
performed the work." While the Wilkins Declaration provides the total amount of hours and Mr.
Wilkins' billing rate, it fails to provide any detail as what tasks Mr. Wilkins performed or the
time spent on any task. Because of this failure, is the Court is unable to properly assess whether

the work performed by Mr. Wilkins was unreasonable. See, e.g., Holladay Towne Center, LLC v.

Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, if21 ("Although the Browns' affidavit generally
listed a number of services provided by their attorneys and identified each attorney's hourly rate,
there was no breakdown as to which attorney performed which services, the hours spent on each
service, or even the total number of hours expended on the litigation. The Browns' affidavit fails

to substantially answer the questions identified in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988) ... ").
6
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18.

While the Wilkins Declaration states that the ''services performed by me on behalf

of the UALD were both reasonable and necessary," in exercising its discretion the Court is "not
necessarily compelled to accept such self-interested testimony whole cloth and make such an
award." Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978). Specifically, the Court
notes in this case that Energy Enterprises took the lead in the discovery disputes in this case and
at trial and the Court is unable to detennine a reasonable fee amount for the UALD absent any
detail supporting the UALD's request for fees.
19.

For these reasons, the Court declines to award the UALD any attorney's fees.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters the following Concl~sions

of Law:
I.

"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract."

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P .2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) ( citations omitted).
2.

Here, in its May 2017 Findings the held "that pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-5-

825(1), the Court detennines that Mr. Harper filed his wage claim in bad faith and that
Respondents are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees in defense of this action."

3.

As set forth above, and based on the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court,5

the Court determines that Energy Enterprises is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of
$14,910.00.

5

See Bracken, 764 P.2d at 990 C'Although all of the above factors may be explicitly considered in
detennining a reasonable fee, as a practical matter the trial court should find answers to four questions: 1.
What lega] work was actually performed? 2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary
to adequately prosecute the matter? 3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates custcimarily
I

(i

7

·0471
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.

As set forth above, UALD failed to meet its burden to establish an amount of

reasonable attorneys' fees and to comply with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
thus, the Court declines to award UALD any attorney's fees.
5.

Energy Enterprises is directed to submit a form of a judgment consistent with

these preceding Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, pursuant to Rule 58A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

This is the order of the Court, and no further order is required with respect to the

issues set forth herein.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 20 l 7.

BY THE COURT:

charged in the locality for similar services? 4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of
additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?").
8
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